We revisit a college admission market and a related preference revelation game under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (SODA). Previous research has demonstrated the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium (SSN) based on either an iterative deferred acceptance algorithm (DA-SSN) or the core of a corresponding house allocation problem (Core-SSN). We propose a new equilibrium concept called passively-strictly strong Nash equilibrium (P-SSN). It rules out a kind of deviation called passively weak deviation which includes students who were threatened to deviate. Then we show two preliminary existence results about P-SSN. (i) If the DA-SSN and the Core-SSN are not equivalent, then neither of them is a P-SSN. (ii) If the matching determined by the DA-SSN satisfies a property called irrelevance of low-tier agents, then the DA-SSN is also a P-SSN.
Introduction
A college admission market is usually formulated as a many-to-one matching problem. In this problem, each college can admit multiple students but each student can attend at most one college. This model adopts a primary solution concept called stable matching. We can use the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (SODA) which is proposed by Gale and Shapley [1] to find a stable matching that all students weakly prefer it to any other stable matching 1 .
An important research topic on this problem is studying students' strategic behavior. Specifically, a college admission market can be formulated as a strategic game in which each college's true preferences over students are known publicly, but each student's preferences over colleges are revealed strategically.
This game adopts a primary solution concept called strong Nash equilibrium (SN) . It is a strategy profile under which none of the student groups can make all its members strictly better off by changing their joint strategies. Dubins and Freedman [3] demonstrated that the truth-telling strategy profile is a SN. However, Bando [4] , Dubins and Freedman [3] and Sotomayor [5] all showed that it does not satisfy a stronger equilibrium concept, in the sense that none of the student groups can make all its members weakly better off and at least one member strictly better off by changing their joint strategies.
Bando [4] formally named this equilibrium concept as strictly strong Nash equilibrium (SSN) . He then demonstrated the existence of two SSNs. The first one is obtained by iteratively applying the standard deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) so that we simply call it DA-SSN. This SSN has a very nice property that it always exists. Moreover, alternative algorithms can be found in Kesten [6] and Tang and Yu [7] . The other one is obtained by constructing a corresponding house allocation problem which is defined in Shapley and Scarf [8] and then identifying the strict core. We simply call it Core-SSN. We note that its existence depends on whether the strict core exists. Under SODA, both of DA-SSN and Core-SSN yield a matching that weakly Pareto dominates the matching determined by students' true preferences.
In this research, we propose a new equilibrium concept called passivelystrictly strong Nash equilibrium (P-SSN). It is stronger than both DA-SSN and Core-SSN. It rules out a deviation called passively weak deviation. Such a deviating coalition includes members who become strictly worse off, which means such a student was actually unwilling to deviate. But if not doing so, she will receive an even worse outcome caused by the unilateral deviation of the rest members. In this sense, there exist students who "passively'' joined the deviating coalition.
Then we show two preliminary existence results about P-SSN. (i) If the DA-SSN and the Core-SSN are not equivalent, then neither of them is a P-SSN.
(ii) If the matching determined by the DA-SSN under SODA satisfies a property called irrelevance of low-tier agents, then it is also a P-SSN. In general, P-SSN is a quite restrictive equilibrium concept. But nevertheless, we will discuss some extensions that possibly give inspiration to the refinement problem when multiple SSNs exist.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a college admission market and a related preference revelation game under SODA. Section 3 defines our equilibrium concept with an example, and shows two preliminary results about its existence problem. Section 4 concludes and discusses 1 See Roth and Sotomayor [2] for a comprehensive introduction. some possible directions for the future research.
Preliminaries

College Admission Market
Let ( ) , , , ,
be a college admission market. I is a finite set of students, and C is a finite set of colleges. Each student i has strict preferences i  over Dubins and Freedman [3] showed that the truth-telling strategy profile I  is always a SN, but it may not be a SSN. Hence the existence problem of SSN becomes one of the focuses in the later research. Bando [4] demonstrated the existence of the following two SSNs.
Preference Revelation Game
DA-SSN
Given a market ( ) , , , ,
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 be the profile of the restricted preferences. Then the iterative DA is defined as follows.
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proceed to the next step.
This algorithm terminates in finite steps and yields a strategy profile ( )
, let µ be a stable matching in this market. Then let ( ) * * , ,
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I µ  be a corresponding house allocation problem which is defined in Shapley and Scarf [8] .
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If x is a strict core allocation, then the strategy profile ( )
 is the Core-SSN. Particularly, we note that this result depends on whether the strict core exists.
Under SODA, both of the DA-SSN and the Core-SSN yield a matching which is Pareto efficient, and weakly Pareto dominates the matching determined by students' true preferences.
Results
Equilibrium Concept
In this section, we propose a new equilibrium concept which is stronger than SSN (and thus it is stronger than both DA-SSN and Core-SSN). First of all, we use a simple example to show how it is defined. The student-optimal stable matching µ is: 
i i i i i
Similarly, we observe that 
In a passively weak deviating coalition S, only a subgroup of members T are at least weakly better off. For each member in \ S T , although joining S will bring her an outcome which is worse than that in a SSN, she has to do so because the outcome caused by T's unilateral deviation is even worse for her. In this sense, each student in \ S T "passively" chooses to deviate. We say that a strategy profile
 is a passively-strictly strong Nash equilibrium (P-SSN) if each coalition does not have any passively weak deviation.
We note that T S = also be a passively weak deviation, and thus a P-SSN must be a SSN. However, Example 1 shows that the converse may not be true.
Existence
In this section, we study the existence problem of P-SSN. Particularly, we examine under which conditions a DA-SSN or a Core-SSN would become a P-SSN.
We first introduce two strategies that will support our next results. One is the c-bottom strategy proposed by Bando [4] . Given a market ( ) , , , , 
Here we note that the deviating coalition's joint strategies have a quite simple structure. Roth [10] and Bando [4] demonstrated that if a coalition S has a successful deviation (either in a strong sense or in a weak sense), then it equals to using a simplified strategy that each student in S reports the deviating outcome as her first choice. Therefore, we also consider this kind of simple deviation in this research.
Based on the previous results, we are ready to introduce our first finding. We show that if the DA-SSN and the Core-SSN yield different matchings under SODA, then neither of them is a P-SSN. In other words, we can always construct a passively weak deviation at either the DA-SSN or the Core-SSN. 
Proof. (i) We first show that we can construct a passively weak deviation at
Core I  . By assumption, there exists i I ∈ such that ( ) ( )  . We note that ( ) ( ) ( )
This implies that ν is also stable in the market ( ) , , , ,
. However, µ is the student-optimal matching in this market, which implies that ( ) ( )
Hence the only possibility is that ( ) ( ) □ However, the Core-SSN usually fails to exist since it depends on the existence of the strict core in the corresponding house allocation problem. Therefore, our second result focuses on the DA-SSN. We show that under SODA, if the DA-SSN yields a matching which satisfies a condition called irrelevance of low-tier agents, then it is also a P-SSN. 
This condition requires each student not to accept the assignment of any student who was identified as the last proposer in an earlier step than she was.
The next lemma is a direct application of Lemma 1. 
2) ( ) ( ) 
Conclusion and Discussion
In this research, we revisit a college admission market and a related preference revelation game under SODA. We propose a new equilibrium concept called passively-strictly strong Nash equilibrium (P-SSN). It rules out a deviating coalition called passively weak deviation that includes members who become strictly worse off. In other words, they were actually unwilling to deviate. But if not doing so, they will receive an even worse outcome which is caused by the unilateral deviation of the rest members. In this sense, some students were threatened to join the deviating coalition. Then we show two preliminary existence results about P-SSN. In general, P-SSN is a quite restrictive equilibrium concept that easily fails to exist. But nevertheless, we plan to examine the following two extensions of Definition 1. . That is, each student who deviates passively should receive a strictly better outcome than that caused by the rest students' unilateral deviation. With those assumptions, we can check that the SSNs in Example 1 would become P-SSN. Such equilibrium concepts give inspiration to the refinement problem when multiple equilibria exist, which we will study in the future research.
